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Abstract:   Over the past decade, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation has sponsored a series of
industry studies, the aim of which is to understand how technology and human resources
practices blend together to create high-performance workplaces and competitive industries. 
This report summarizes the first year of one of the studies devoted to the financial services
industry: an analysis of the performance of financial services.  After a brief overview of this
project, the report discusses a conceptual framework and initial empirical evidence on the
drivers of competitiveness in consumer financial services, in particular, commercial banking. 
The plan of work to be done in the second year of the project is then provided.
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information technology, productivity1.0 Introduction
Financial services comprise over 4% of the Gross Domestic Product in the United States as well as
employing over 5.4 million people, more than double the combined number of people employed in
the manufacture of apparel, automobiles, computers, pharmaceuticals, and steel
l. While
impressive, these numbers belie the much larger role that this industry plays in the economy
(Herring and Santomero 1991). Financial services firms provide the payment services and
financial products which enable households and firms to participate in the broader economy. By
offering vehicles for investment of savings, extension of credit, and risk management, they fuel the
modern capitalistic society.
While the essential functions performed by the organizations that make up the industry (the
provision of payment services and facilitation of the allocation of economic resources over time and
space) have remained relatively constant over the past several decades, the structure of the industry
has undergone dramatic change. Liberalized domestic regulation, intensified international
competition, rapid innovations in new financial instruments, and the explosive growth in
information technology fuel this change. With this change has come increasing pressure on
managers and workers to dramatically improve productivity and financial performance.
Competition has created a fast-paced industry where firms must change in order to survive.
This report summarizes the first year of a multi-year effort to understand the drivers of
performance in financial services organizations. Such results are important to individual firms as
they seek to build high-performance workplaces, and to policy-makers in developing regulations,
job training programs, and trade policies which aid rather than hinder this vital segment of our
economy. In addition, financial services are the largest single consumer of information technology
in the economy, investing $38.7 billion dollars in 1991 (National Research Council 1994; p. 2).
This investment has had a profound effect on the overall structure of the industry, the number and
types of products and services offered to the consumer, and on the skill levels of the human
resources in the industry. However, its effect on financial performance of the industry remains
elusive (National Research Council 1994). Why this “productivity paradox” (Brynjolfsson and
Hitt 1993) exists is an important part of the project described herein.
In order to understand the drivers of performance in the financial services industry, one must first
confront the fact that services are different from manufacturing, which is the focus of all the other
Sloan-sponsored projects (apparel, automobiles, computers, pharmaceuticals, powered metals,
semiconductors, steel, textiles). Why? One major reason is co-production, the fact that the
consumer is often adding labor to the creation of the services. As stated by Fuchs (1968) in his
seminal work on services, ”...productivity in many services industries is dependent in part on the
knowledge, experience, and motivation of the consumer.” In addition, the scope of the service
enterprise is typically quite vast, with components of the service production process being both
producers and deliverers of the service. As stated by Norsworthy and Lang (1992; p. 202):
. . . it is useful to distinguish producing services from dispensing them. In the
banking sector, it is clear that the enterprise as a whole produces the services; the
services are dispensed through a network of establishments which are regularly
staffed by employees and Automatic Teller Machines, or ATMs: pseudo-
lComparison based on average 1991 data reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings
Report, March 1992. Data for the financial services industry includes SIC codes 60-64 and 67. Data for the apparel,
automobile, computer, pharmaceutical and steel industries include SIC codes 239 (less 23), 371, 357, 283, 331, and
332.2
establishments, or lesser network nodes, which are not staffed. An accurate
characterization of the output of the banking enterprise must not only include
multiple outputs, it must also include some representation of the network
dispensing those outputs. In fact, major dimensions of competition among banking
enterprises in the U.S. include the size of the network and the time of day where
services are available. This network dimension is generally recognized as an
important dimension of utilities, transportation, and communication services; it also
appears in financial services as we have argued, and may well be important in other
service sectors such as retail trade.
Simply put, consumers do not have any interaction with an auto assembly plant, but they do
participate in the processes of the bank branch. As participants in this co-productive process,
customers care far more about the inner-workings of the bank than the assembly plant. Stated
differently by Delaunay and Gadrey (1992; p. 124):
Finally, the question can be asked whether, for some services (customized services
like health services, information intensive services, advanced producer services) the
very concept of productivity, built to analyze mass production, without any
consideration of the indirect effects of the service on the customer, is still relevant.
Along with the active participation of the consumer in service production, one must be aware that
the quality of the services provided is forever changing. In commenting on the problems of
measuring service productivity, Griliches (1992; p. 7) states: “Over all this hangs the ubiquitous
issue of quality change. The problem is general and pervasive.” Of course this problem also
exists in some manufactured goods, such as computers, but “in some service industries, ...because
of the underlying heterogeneity of transactions, the difficulty of making comparisons across time
and space is even greater...” (Griliches 1992; p. 7) than for commodities. That is, the financial
service product is a commodity. The transaction, a combination of the product and the delivery, is
heterogeneous.
Productivity gains from human resource improvements or technology investments may not show
up in standard performance measures but rather, be used to improve the quality of the service
provided. As stated by Delaunay and Gadrey (1992; p. 125; emphasis added):
The introduction of new technologies in most services (retailing, banking,
insurance, producer services) is very rapid and, to some extent, looks like classical
industrialization. But all these studies converge to show that it is generally achieved
not by the disappearance of the service dimension (i.e., relations, adaptation to
individual demand, consultancy, assistance) but in such a way that, whereas the
simplest part of the service is partly automatised, there is at the same time an
expansion of the most relational and most complex part of the service. This could
be one explanation for the apparent stagnation of productivity in these sectors,
insofar as this productivity is assessed without taking into account the increasing
level, range, and nature of the services provided.
If true, what appears to be a stagnation in productivity may actually be an increase in value
delivered to the customer. Moreover, delivering value to the customer provides the institution with
sales opportunities and much needed information about the institution’s customer base. In fact, by
decreasing traditional productivity, a bank may increase overall performance through increased
interaction with the customer, or co-producer. The pilot survey examines the relationship between
technological advancement and the relational part of service delivery by studying time spent with
the customer in relation to technological sophistication and time spent on the entire delivery
process.3
While we have attempted to draw a distinction between manufacturing and services, the differences
are more a matter of degree than of sharp distinctions between these sectors. For example, quality
is an issue in terms of the measurement of manufacturing productivity in a similar fashion as in the
service sector; just not to as great an extent. Similarly, consumers actively engage in after-sales
support of products which is similar to the aspects of co-production for most services, but again,
not to as great an extent. As the first service-sector study, however, it is important to highlight the
differences up front and realize that a traditional mass production study of productivity simply will
not suffice. Rather, we must confront the issues raised above in a creative manner.
In particular, we recognize that industry has embraced reengineering and a process-management
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focus (see, e.g., Davenport and Short 1990 for a description of the reengineering phenomenon) for
a reason. Whether in manufacturing or the service-sector, service delivery processes are service
delivery processes. To achieve improvement, financial service institutions must learn from similar
processes in other industries, and as academics our focus must shift to a process or value-chain
orientation in both our research and in management practice.
The traditional approach to process management and control is to develop an optimal schema for
work and then to encode this into the organizational culture and resulting information systems.
For example, the standard industrial engineering (IE)/operations research approach to process
improvement is to study the process, simulate it, and then propose a new process design. The
design is then implemented by the creation of new job descriptions, incentives, and information
systems. In this sense, the new process is literally encoded by the process definition and
supporting IT and incentive structures. Process reengineering has reinvented/ rediscovered this
traditional IE approach, but in the context of white-collar work (Davenport and Short 1990). The
important contribution of the reengineering phenomenon has been the focus on processes as the
central unit of management.
If processes are viewed as the central “technology” of an organization (Davenport and Short 1990;
Morroni 1992), an important analogy emerges. As with any technology, the process must be
maintained -- herein lies the role of continuous process improvement (CPI) and other incremental
quality programs. Furthermore, after a process has reached its useful life, it should be scrapped
and/or rebuilt -- herein lies reengineering. Thus, one must take a life-cycle view of processes
when undertaking a benchmarking/ efficiency study. Just because my 386 PC is slower does not
mean I immediately scrap it for a 486 machine; I need to make sure that the technology has
achieved its useful life. The same is true for processes. If it was not, we would be forever
reengineering without the benefit of CPI. The conclusion from this analogy is that a process-
oriented study of efficiency and efficacy must include the “age” and “investment” in the process as
well as technology and quality/human resource practices.
Therefore, our approach to studying performance drivers in financial services relies heavily on a
process-oriented methodology. In addition, we shall not focus on traditional measures of
productivity or financial performance such as transactions per FTE or ROA and ROE. Instead, we
will base comparisons on intermediary measures which evaluate the drivers of performance from
the perspective of all participants in the co-productive process.
2A ‘process’ is a specific ordering of work activities across time and place, with a beginning, an end, and clearly
identified inputs and outputs: a structure for action (Davenport 1993). Thus a company is a collection of processes
(e.g., delivery processes, financial management processes, account origination processes, performance management
processes, etc.) and consumers are affected by numerous processes from multiple organizations.4
Roth and van der Velde (199la) reinforce, in part, our views in their recent study of performance
in retail banking. In their report, the authors summarize the major success factors as stated by
industry leaders:
(1) flexibility and responsiveness in operations.
(2) ability to understand the importance of time-based competitiveness in responding to
customer needs and expectations.
(3) ability to change capacity rapidly and improve customer access.
(4) ability to introduce innovative products quickly through superior workforces and
systems.
(5) ability to match products to customer expectations effectively (conformance
quality).
These success factors are consistent with those we found in preliminary industry interviews
conducted last year. Our work uses these principles as well as many others (as described in
Section 3) as motivation to focus on performance, not productivity, as the measure of effectiveness
in the marketplace.
While our ultimate goal is to study the entire financial services industry, we begin with a segment
that covers all sectors -- consumer financial services. This segment of the industry includes retail
banking, consumer-oriented insurance products, mutual funds, mortgage banking, credit cards,
property and casualty insurance, and retirement. That is, the segment of the industry which
provides products and services for users who are or act like individuals. More specifically, the
focus for the first part of this study, and of this report, is on consumer banking. By focusing here,
we will directly confront the issues raised above, while at the same time providing insight into this
important segment of the industry which has tremendous impact due to its rapid change, large scale
employment, massive technology investments, omnipresent regulatory concerns, and increasing
competitive dynamics. Our goal is to meet the challenge laid out by Griliches (1992; p. 7) in his
assessment of productivity/performance modeling for services:
. . . the necessary economic-engineering research that would tell us which of the
characteristics and training levels are important for their successful performance has
not been done. We are thus lacking the scientific base for the desired measurement
procedures.
It is our intention to provide this engineering-economic research for consumer banking initially,
secondly for consumer financial services, and finally, for all segments of the financial services
industry.
The structure of the remainder of this report is as follows. The next section will review the related
literature and non-published evidence that currently exists on financial services and performance.
Section 3 will present the conceptual framework for our study. Section 4 will describe our
research methodology to investigate this framework, and Section 5 will present the preliminary
empirical results from the pilot survey.2.0 Literature Review
A large number of studies have been undertaken over the past decade dealing with the efficiency of
banks. The typical study attempts to ascertain whether scale or scope economies exist in banking.
In addition to these traditional economic explanations of performance differences among firms,
recent studies have focused on the notion of X-efficiency (Leibenstein 1966), a measure of the
performance of an organization relative to the best practice in that industry. More precisely, X-
efficiency describes all technical and allocative efficiencies of individual firms that are not scale/
scope dependent. Thus X-efficiency is a measure of how well management is deploying
technology, human resources, and other assets to achieve a given level of performance. As stated
by Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993; p. 228):
The one result upon which there is virtual consensus is that X-efficiency differences
across banks are relatively large and dominate scale and scope efficiencies.
Other results, such as those reported by Fried, Lovell and Vanden Eeckaut (1993) in the context of
credit unions, demonstrate that this claim exists in both large and small institutions.
Based on this evidence, our focus in this study will not be to ascertain the effects of scale and
scope upon firm-level efficiency. Rather, holding these effects constant, our focus will be to
explain why X-efficiency varies among financial institutions. That is, our goal is to understand
how technology, human resources, and process management methods vary across these
organizations and how this variation affects performance. In so doing, we are attempting to
address the concern raised by Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993) at the conclusion of their
profit efficiency study of banks:
Our results suggest that inefficiencies in U.S. banking are quite large -- the industry
appears to lose about half of its potential variable profits to inefficiency. Not
surprisingly, technical inefficiencies dominate allocative inefficiencies, suggesting
that banks are not particularly poor at choosing input and output plans, but rather
are poor at carrying out these plans.
Therefore, our focus will be on the implementation of strategies rather than the strategies
themselves (see Section 3.2).
This evidence from econometric literature is backed-up by recent survey-based research on retail
banking. Based on their survey results, Roth and van der Velde (199la; p. 35) conclude that:
We have found what may be a counter-intuitive discovery: Best-in-class retail banks
developed both their operations and marketing capabilities simultaneously, rather
than sequentially. As a result, they enjoyed greater profitability and superior
performance across the board, but especially on innovation and speed.
That is, high-performing retail banks (as defined by ROE and ROA) seem to be able to move to the
efficiency frontier by focusing the operations on the customer, thus becoming more efficient and of
higher quality. In so doing, they seem to take a process-oriented approach (Roth and van der
Velde 1991a; p. 35):6
Best-in-class banks are creating “seamless” front- and back-room operations
intricately linked and intensively responsive to the task of satisfying target
customers. Furthermore, best-in-class banks are working hard to take “time” out of
the total organization in order to flex their strategic muscles through unprecedented
speed of retail delivery and responsiveness to customers.
Thus, the trend of a front-office/ back-office dichotomy is out of date. The emphasis should be on
processes that the customer values rather than traditional back-office productivity measures such as
checks processed per FTE.
In summary, Roth and van der Velde come to the same conclusion as Berger et al., namely:
For these reasons, a bank’s ultimate performance, despite external conditions, is
strongly influenced by the predisposition of management to not only develop
innovative solutions for the future, but also to create the milieu for their successful
implementation.
That is, they conclude that it is management practices that seem to drive the success of these
organizations in the long-run.
Other studies seem to come to similar conclusions; that is, management practices are essential to
performance, and the concept of productivity or performance should have a notion of value added
at each stage of the process.
One key area of management practices, for example, is the management of human resources.
Studies in manufacturing have clearly shown the effects of different ways of managing employees
on performance outcomes such as productivity (MacDuffie 1991; Ichniowski and Shaw 1994) and
quality (MacDuffie 1991; Arthur 1994). Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that the
management of people in financial services may also affect performance outcomes. (See, for
example, Long 1988; Beatty and Gup 1989; ABA Banking Journal, 1991; Roth and van der Velde
1991.) Yet careful empirical studies considering the role of human resources in financial services
have taken one of two tacks. Much of the solid econometric work on efficiency of financial service
organizations considers crude aggregate measures of labor as an input (labor cost, hours worked,
or number of employees) without attention to the management of labor. Further, work that
considers management practices focuses on high-level managers (for example, Donnelly et. al.
1989; Seller 1992; Blackwell et al 1994) but does not address the bulk of the workforce involved
in delivering financial services to customers. Neither of these two approaches allows for the
possibility that banks may gain competitive advantage from innovative management of the broader
workforce. One study, however, suggests that top performing Finnish banks are leaders with
respect to training and employee empowerment (Tainio et al 1991), a result consistent with the
manufacturing studies cited above.
Technology also plays a key role in the performance of firms in this industry. Roth and van der
Velde (1991b; Figure 3) show that $392,000 per bank ($2.1 million for banks with more than $3
billion assets) is spent annually on platform automation and $502,000 ($3.2 million for the larger
banks) is spent on upgrading information and transaction processing. Even with these large
investments, it is still difficult to ascertain the payoffs associated with these projects. In
manufacturing, recent studies (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1993; Lichtenberg 1993) have found large
payoffs in information technology (IT) investments, both in terms of equipment and personnel.
For example, Lichtenberg (1993; p.22) states that“...the estimated marginal rate of substitution
between IS and non-IS employees, evaluated at the sample mean, is 6: one IS employee can
substitute for six non-IS employees without affecting output.”7
Unfortunately, similar results for financial services are not available (mainly due to the
measurement problems discussed in Section 1.0). For example, in the recent study by the National
Research Council (1994; p.81) on IT in services, the problem in the context of banking is
summarized as follows:
Neither approach [for productivity measurement] is able to account for
improvements in the quality of service offered to customers or for the availability of
a much wider array of banking services. For example, the speed with which the
processing of a loan application is completed is an indicator of service that is
important to the applicant, as is the 24-hour availability through automated teller
machines (ATMs) of many deposit and withdrawal services previously accessible
only during bank hours. Neither of these services is captured as higher banking
output at the macroeconomic level.
While hard and fast data are not yet available, many believe that financial services are at the brink
of major performance improvements due to technology. However, this will not come in the
traditional back-office functions. Rather, the performance improvements will arise in the
integration of front- and back-office functions; i.e., in integrating business processes. Roach
(1993; p. 10) points out that the consolidation of back-office operations is due in large part to scale
economies due to IT investments, but that these investments are becoming increasingly difficult to
find. However, he states that “...new productivity opportunities are now spreading rapidly across
the sales function of the service sector...” It is precisely in these front-office functions that major
investments will occur. Philip Kotler (as cited in Pine 1993; pp. 43-44) states this trend clearly:
Instead of viewing the bank as an assembly line provider of standardized services,
the bank can be viewed as a job shop with flexible production capabilities. At the
heart of the bank would be a comprehensive customer database and a product profit
database. The bank would be able to identify all the services used by any customer,
the profit (or loss) on these services and the potentially profitable services which
may be proposed to that customer... This movement away from mass marketing,
mass production, and mass distribution is widespread throughout the financial
services industry.
Thus, the process orientation of the reengineering phenomenon is vital in understanding the
benefits of technology and human resource practices. It is precisely this process orientation that
underlies many of the successful studies of human resource and quality practices (MacDuffie 1991;
Thomas 1992, 1993; Zuboff 1985), technology investments (Lynch 1991; Parsons et al. 1991),
and their interactions. Our intent in this study is to use a process view as the basis for
understanding how IT and human resources interact to move firms to the boundary of the
performance frontier.3.0 Performance in Consumer Financial Services - A Conceptual
Framework
As stated in Section 1, the initial focus of our project is to understand the drivers of
competitiveness in consumer financial services. As discussed previously, this focus will enable us
to highlight the distinctive features of a service industry. More specifically, our focus is on
consumer banking for the current report, although we believe that the framework is applicable to a
wide range of consumer-oriented financial services operations.
Based on the literature, one year of field interviews with eighteen major retail banks and financial
services companies, and discussions with leading academics, we have developed a conceptual
framework for performance analysis (see Figure 1). In what follows, we will describe each
component of this framework.
3.1 Industry Conditions
Financial services organizations are constrained and influenced by the broader economic and
regulatory environment. The effects of these industry conditions vary along a number of
dimensions. Regulations, for example, vary from state to state, and affect commercial banks
differently than they affect consumer finance companies. In fact, some argue that such regulatory
constraints greatly limit the banking industry’s ability to compete effectively with other non-bank
participants in the financial services arena. We do not wish to enter this debate at this point, but
rather note the importance of regulation on the behavior of individual financial institutions.
Other key environmental variables that must be controlled in a study of performance in financial
services include changing demography (see, e.g., Furash 1992), the overall macroeconomic
climate, the competitive nature of the market (e.g., whether interstate banking is permitted), and the
legal restrictions imposed on banks that may not be imposed on other financial services
organizations (e.g., community lending provisions). In all of these cases, we must be cognizant of
their existence and impact on behavior, but will not focus our attention on the study of their
efficiency or efficacy at this point. That is, to the extent possible, we want to focus on the factors
that management can control.
3.2  Firm Strategy
Financial service organizations also vary in their strategic responses to broad industry conditions.
For example, many (but not all) large commercial banks have pursued a strategy of corporate
growth by acquisition; further, banks vary greatly in their implementation of acquisition strategy.
And not all financial service organizations choose to compete in all markets. For example, some
banks place more emphasis on competing in wholesale markets, others focus on retail markets, and
a few have virtually abandoned commercial banking altogether. Further, there are substantial
variations in business-level strategies and segment focus within broader markets. Some banks, for
example, treat the processing of transactions as an important generator of revenue; others treat
transaction processing as a function necessary to support other processes and may even outsource
this activity.10
Industry conditions, choices of corporate strategy, and strategic approaches to lines of business
may have strong effects on firm competitiveness. It is not our intention in this study to minimize
the importance of these effects. However, we are less concerned herein with the choice of optimal
strategies, and more interested in the successful implementation of the strategy chosen. One can
understand this in the context of a broader, unresolved debate in the strategy literature. Teece et al.
(1992) claim that various approaches to strategy are divided into four camps which vary by the
assumed opportunity for, or source of, competitive advantage:
(1) attenuating competitive forces: market structure.
(2) strategic conflict: a game theoretic approach.
(3) resource-based perspectives: uniqueness of a firm’s resources.
(4) dynamic capabilities perspectives: ability to learn and adapt.
As Teece et.al. note, no convergence of thought has emerged on the relative value of the
perspectives. Theoretical and empirical work to date do not tell us definitively a priori whether
sources of competitive advantage lie predominantly outside or inside the firm.
Our initial focus is thus guided by our desire to direct attention to issues of implementation and
their effects on performance. The importance of broader choices of markets and strategies is at
least partially addressed in the efficiency literature, in particular studies of bank efficiency, which
lead us to believe that additional internal focus is merited. As Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey
(1993) note (emphasis added):
...technical inefficiencies dominate allocative inefficiencies, suggesting that banks
are not particularly poor at choosing input and output plans, but rather are poor at
carrying out these plans.
Generally, then, our approach does not focus on strategic advantage derived from factors external
to the firm. Strategic choices at the corporate and business levels, approaches to growth, and
decisions about markets and segments may well be crucial, and we recognize the potential
importance of those factors emphasized in the literature drawn from industrial organization (Bain,
1959; Caves and Porter, 1977; Porter, 1980), however, in the current study, we intend to treat
these choices as control variables: our focus will be on the way firms manage processes, people,
and technology.
Our approach may be slightly better positioned to address sources of competitive advantage drawn
from inside the firm: what are described as resource-based sources of competitive advantage
(Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1986). This approach may also lend itself to a better understanding of
dynamic capabilities and the development and maintenance of strategic advantage over time
(Lippman and Rumelt 1982). To the extent that such resources or capabilities lie in the way firms
manage technology (Teece 1987), people (Cappelli and Singh 1992), or, as we suggest,
processes, we may be able to identify possible key resources and capabilities in financial services.
Of course, considerable further work is necessary to determine the extent to which firm-specific
practices are difficult to imitate and thus truly sources of sustainable advantage (Barney 1991).11
3.3  Choice of Management Infrastructure
Once an organization chooses an overall strategic direction, they have a series of choices as to how
to implement this strategy. In particular, management must choose management structure and
processes. This choice of strategy implementation falls within the purview of the current study, as
depicted by the gray box in Figure 1.
3.3.1 Resource Management
Resource management involves the process of budgeting, determining capital investments,
managing resources, and monitoring of the above. While we are not attempting to survey this
process, we will use its outputs as indicators of a firm’s priorities and strategy. Understanding
where resources are allocated will accomplish several things. First, it will reveal where the bank is
in terms of its lifecycle. That is, is it spending money on acquisitions, on keeping or increasing
market share, or on technological advantage? Second, it will provide insight into what the bank
considers its future direction. For example, if the majority of the spending is on opening new
branches, then there is a different anticipation than if the spending was on new forms of electronic
delivery. Finally, it will allow us to assess whether the resource allocation matches the stated
strategy. That is, whether or not the bank is supporting stated philosophies with necessary
spending levels.
3.3.2 Information Architecture
The information architecture delineates where and how information travels throughout the
organization. It is the roads and sewers of the communication and information flow. The ability to
perform audits, utilize sophisticated segmentation schemes, and to measure and monitor
performance are just a few of the activities which rely on the information architecture.
Besides the amount of resources allocated many issues speak to the level of sophistication and
commitment that an institution has for its information architecture. The ease of communication,
accessibility of information, automated collection of information, and the standardization of
existing information all illustrate the presence of a visible information architecture.
A commitment to an information architecture is especially apparent in an acquisition scenario. If
the acquiring institution forces the acquired institution to convert to the common information
structure - regardless of the quality of the latter institution’s systems - then there is likely a strong
and consistent architecture. Similarly, if all the branches within a retail system receive identical
performance information from a central source, this also indicates the existence of a solid
information philosophy.
3.3.3 Performance Management and Control
Performance management and control is the process of collecting the appropriate data and the art of
knowing how to use it. Within the performance management process, performance reporting
should serve as the engine for well-informed decision making as well as informing the ability to
control the institution through incentives and accountability. Good performance information will12
make the right people focus on the right things without creating the information overload
complained about in many institutions.
The goal of performance measurement is always to have the information necessary to encourage
success. Thus, if a bank has a product emphasis, performance reporting should facilitate product
measurement just as a bank with a segment focus should have reporting which allows for
incentives based on segment performance. The ability to accurately incent cross-selling explicitly
depends on the availability of adequate cross-selling information such as which products are more
likely to cross-sell, and which are profitable in various situations. The ideal situation is one in
which the use of management information or performance measurement facilitates, rather than
detracts from, implementing the strategy of the bank.
A key to providing accurate and actionable information lies in the collection of this information.
While the dissemination of appropriate information is essential to directing a business, this
information is fueled by smaller pieces of information which must be collected at the source. For
example, sales volumes must be captured at the point of sale in order to use the information as the
basis of an incentive system. Similarly, individual loan performance must be tracked in order to
evaluate the exposure and performance of the entire portfolio and make decisions regarding
potential lending characteristics.
The ability to use this information relies on its timeliness and accuracy. If information arrives late
or is not dependable, the ability of management to make decisions or encourage behavior is
undermined. Thus, the method of information collection is extremely important. While
automation clearly facilitates information collection, the tracking process must allow for the rapid
analysis and dissemination of the resulting information.
3.3.4 Organizational Structure
The choice of organizational structure is interconnected with the above two items in that the
structure will impact, and be impacted by, the general management processes devoted to strategy
implementation. The goal is to create an organizational structure which furthers the firm’s strategy
by encouraging and enhancing communication, institutional problem solving, cross-functional
efforts, and the leveraging of resources, while at the same time providing the control necessary to
achieve success. To enable strategy through organizational structure, an institution must define
how it intends to grow, and organize accordingly. For example, if an organization intends to
achieve growth by focusing on particular market segment, the organization might want to organize
and create accountabilities around segments.
As a means for focusing and directing an institution, organizational structure will ideally mirror the
success components of the strategy. For this reason, organizational structure should consider the
development of a reporting hierarchy and the placement of functional areas as a strategic decision.
For instance, if a particular retail strategy depends on the operations of the phone center, then the
phone center might be better placed under the control of the person held responsible for the success
of the strategy. The success at organizing accountability and control into related areas will likely
lead to higher performance.
Besides control, other concerns in the structuring of an organization are communication and
efficiency. The placement and power of the retail bank within the bank holding company affects
the ability of an institution to create efficiencies and facilitate the communication necessary for
success. In making these choices, issues such as centralization, local control, economies of scale,
and contingency planning arise and should be addressed according to their associated strategy.13
3.4  Implementation Choices
After management articulates a strategy and its associated value goals, the firm’s challenge is to
confront the “how” of reaching those goals. Technology, human resources, the development and
management of a customer base and appropriate products and services, and the delivery and
service of these products and services must all be synchronized to achieve the strategic objectives
of the organization. Hopefully, in developing and supporting the means of implementation,
management revisits these corporate strategies and ensures that each resource is working towards
the firm’s goals. In the implementation choices, the bank is facilitating its success or failure. In
fact, our interviews identified three main areas which seem to “make-or-break” the success of a
chosen strategy by the bank: human resource management, use of technology, and the design and
management of product/service delivery processes.
The notion of choice need not imply that firms or their managers continually review and update all
aspects of their processes, technologies, or human resource practices. Such constant activity is
beyond the capacity of any organization; it would carry with it heavy costs which would surely
outweigh any benefits. Rather, in many areas it seems likely that choices are evolutionary (Nelson
and Winter 1982). Particular processes, systems, structures, and practices are re-examined when
some event draws the attention of management to the issue or area in question. At this point,
managers examine options and, where appropriate, choose to implement new ways of doing
things.
Despite this evolutionary process, however, it is important that management understands the means
by which resources are consumed. Just as good management analyzes new investments with
regard to the various options, merits, and costs of the investments, management should also
understand these components of the technology, processes, and human resource practices which
they have inherited over time.
3.4.1 Human Resource Choices
We look at human resource management practices in a number of areas: compensation, hiring and
selection, staffing, training, work organization, and employee involvement. Further, we look at
these practices as they govern both managerial and non-managerial employees. Both groups play
important roles. In branches of retail banks, for example, employees from the manager’s office to
the teller window sell products and support selling at previously unprecedented levels. Practices in
successful retail banks must reinforce the ability of the organization to compete for investment
dollars, to solve customers’ problems, and to complete transactions quickly and accurately.
The management of human resources may contribute to firm performance in two ways (Wright and
Snell 1991). First, good human resource management practices establish skills and competence.
Second, good practices drive appropriate behavior of employees. Most generally, firms with
practices which build competence and reinforce role behavior consistent with market imperatives
and organizational goals are likely to be successful. Specific practices may vary depending on the
requirements of markets and strategies, and finding a “best practice” may not be possible. For
example, if competitiveness requires continued investment in skill levels of certain employee
groups, some banks may train employees extensively while others may focus on recruitment of
employees who already possess the requisite skills.
Recent empirical work in this area suggests a number of considerations. First, there may be a
generic set of good practices common across the industry. Huselid (1994) finds that “High14
Performance Workplaces” as defined by a set of progressive human resource practices are
generally associated with higher productivity and better financial outcomes. Second, individual
practices may reinforce particular strategies by contributing to the achievement of organizational
goals. In the area of compensation, for example, Gerhart, Milkovich and Murray (1992) review
empirical studies and note that pay level, pay structure, rules for determination of individual pay,
and benefit mixes may significantly affect various aspects of organizational performance.
Similarly, training (MacDuffie and Kochan 1991), labor relations (Becker and Olson 1987;
Ichniowski 1992), hiring (Holzer 1987), and rules governing employment security (Osterman
1987) have been linked to firm-level outcomes of interest. Third, groups of practices may bundle
together, representing an underlying logic which is consistent with a particular strategy (MacDuffie
1991; Arthur 1994; Ichniowski and Shaw 1994). Here the proposition is that consistency across
practices is at least as important as individual practices: no single practice is a “silver bullet.”
3.4.2 Technology Implementation Processes
Technology in banking is a key resource in terms of magnitude and importance (Quinn and
Paquette 1990; Steiner and Teixeira 1990). In technology management, the selection of projects
and their management is crucial. In addition, they must support the business processes desired by
the financial institution. The key technological thrusts found in the retail banking survey
conducted by Roth and van der Velde (1992) suggest:
(1) converting to computer systems that provide flexibility in applications and
on-line capabilities to better serve customers and increase the capacity of
service employees.
(2) selecting and installing state-of-the-art applications software for all
consumer products in order to achieve better service quality and
convenience.
(3) integrating systems due to structural changes in the bank’s organization.
In particular, the authors point out that major technology investments are underway to integrate the
traditional front- and back-office systems into a seamless service delivery process.
These and many other studies of information technology suggest that IT is best able to add value
when it “informates,” creating new sources of information in an organization rather than simply
automating existing processes (Zuboff 1985, 1986). In banking, this trend manifests itself in the
desire to provide expertise and information to the people who are in closest contact with
customers.
A major challenge in IT management is project selection and control. In assigning technology
dollars, the logical approach would be to maximize value per dollar. In a perfect world,
management weighs the cost of each technology initiative and its on-going maintenance against its
contribution to financial performance. However, in banking, technology goals are often expressed
in abstract terms such as “convenience” and thus, firms struggle with measuring the effect of the
abstract on the concrete bottom-line.
Once implemented, an advanced technology user will vigorously revisit the assumptions which
motivated the initiative and determine whether the benefits, or values, were achieved. To be
effective, parties responsible for technology initiatives must be held accountable for the realization
of the benefits, thus tying back to the performance measurement and control process. When15
technology does not satisfy its objectives, the failure should be incorporated into institutional
knowledge such that the faulty assumptions or management which contributed to the failure is not
repeated in other technology endeavors.
The importance of vigorous cost-benefit analyses cannot be over-emphasized. While most banks
employ some sort of justification procedure before allocating resources, in most instances these
analyses are not as sophisticated as they should be. Most rely heavily on the assumed performance
benefits of fuzzy goals, do not consider the possibility of or plan a reaction to a changing
environment, and fail to perform any true post-project evaluation to ensure that the planned level of
resources actually produced the anticipated level of benefits. In such a scenario, with no
measurement of success, there is no accountability and no future failure prevention.
Even when the success of a project is commonly accepted, this post-project analysis is important.
Testing and understanding the relationship between the level of resources anticipated and the level
actually consumed to produce the desired benefit adds immeasurably to an institution’s ability to
continue to predict and produce value through technology. Unfortunately, in the pilot banks, if
there is any post-project analysis, most institutions imply that institutional knowledge only comes
from failure and that what has worked well has no room for improvement.
3.4.3 Product and Service Delivery Processes
In order to understand how a bank interacts with its customers we examined a subset of the
product and service delivery processes. We chose five representative products of the “core” retail
bank. The products include consumer checking, CD, home equity loan, small business loan, and
mutual funds. For each of these products we examined typical transactions such as opening an
account as well as error resolution transactions such as the double posting of a check.
Variation in work-steps and available tools can affect the characteristics of processes. For
example, more sophisticated technology may speed up a process through automation. At the same
time, technology may lengthen process time but increase the information available to the bank or
the customer. Similarly, staffing a particular process with a highly experienced employee may
increase speed or accuracy. Combining different levels of technology and human resources has
different effects; and there are tradeoffs in results associated with different process designs.
In addition, customers have co-productive effects on processes. As an integral part of the process,
the customer is a resource just as the platform representative’s time is a resource. In fact, the time
required of the customer may be a consideration in particular process designs. Some processes
may waste the customers’ time, others will not, some processes will take advantage of interaction
with the customer to increase sales or the information available to the bank.
Like any other resource, a customer contributes different levels of interaction to the process.
Because each customer is different, serving each customer requires different levels of bank
resources. For example, serving an elderly customer may require more time than serving a college
student. Not only are the demands of each customer different, but the ability to contribute to the
success or ease of a process also differs. As such, one difficulty of process design is
understanding the various audiences being served.
One way that banks seem to address the needs of various consumer constituencies is through
alternative delivery options. These vehicles allow customers to transact essentially on their own
time. With the exception of the phone center, channels such as computer banking, voice response
systems, and ATMs require no human interaction and allow the customer to bank at an individual16
pace. These new channels add a layer of complexity to the process design as multiple channels
will now likely reach the same information systems.
No matter the necessary level of tools and human resources to serve customers, effective bank
management will design processes which leverage resources, allow for institutional
communication, eliminate duplication of efforts, and encourage all the participant functional areas
to work toward the common goals of the organization.
3.5  Value Creation
Past attempts to measure productivity in the financial services arena have used traditional measures
of productivity. However, the role of the customer in the process makes comparison of these
processes to mass production incomplete. To reiterate the thoughts of Delaunay and Gadrey
(1992; p. 124):
Finally, the question can be asked whether, for some services...the very concept of
productivity, built to analyze mass production, without any consideration of the effects of the
service on the customer, is still relevant.
In fact, for both academia and the industry, Delaunay and Gadrey’s question has become a
foregone conclusion. Traditional methods do not measure resources provided by the customer or
benefits provided to the customer even though every bank manager recognizes the role of the
customer in the bank’s performance. Since banks spend a significant amount of time to improve
the customer’s interaction with the bank, any measurement exercise which ignores the inputs from
and the outcomes for the customer is not comprehensive.
To bridge the gap between traditional productivity measures and difficult-to-measure financial
performance, we have developed the value creation component of the framework as an
intermediary set of performance indicators. According to the pilot interviews, these indicators
reflect effective performance in ways that are more meaningful than the more traditional measures
of productivity as they are the goals toward which bank management strives. In addition, they are
similar in spirit to the indicators discovered by Roth and van der Velde (199la) in their survey of
retail banking (see Section 1.0). The framework attempts to capture the values created for several
of the stakeholders: the organization and its management, the shareholders, and the customer. We
describe each of the following values below: customer convenience, precision, efficient cost
structure, adaptability, and market penetration.
3.5.1 Customer Convenience
Historically, consumers have chosen financial services based largely on availability and location.
Unable to have a 24 hour branch on every corner, competitive financial services organizations seek
other ways to meet these demands. With advances in technology and innovations in human
resource practices, the concept of convenience has extended well beyond availability and location
to imply a wide range of products and services available at any time, from any place. Customers
might wish to file loan applications over the phone at 3 a.m. on a Saturday, for example, or to use
a short telephone call to transfer funds between investment vehicles from a remote site. The
development of ATMs, voice response units, computer banking, and the ability to engage in
almost any transaction through these channels illustrates the commitment of the industry to provide
customers with whatever they want, whenever they want it.17
Rapid turnaround time is also increasingly important in financial services. For example, customers
expect firms to be capable of moving money instantly across investment products. Turnaround
time on small consumer loans decreased dramatically from weeks to hours in the last few years, a
trend that continues across a wider range of products such as home mortgages, re-financing, and
second mortgages.
Equally important is the amount of time required of the customer in these co-productive processes.
Whether it is standing in the teller line, filling out a loan application, or coming to the branch for a
loan closing, the demands placed on the customer must be measured and made as mutually
beneficial as possible. Banks walk a fine line between the desire to increase contact with the
customer to increase sales and the desire to decrease time with the customer in order to increase
convenience to the customer.
While clearly important, convenience is difficult to measure in that it is a value perceived by the
customer which therefore depends upon the make-up of the customer base (Parasuraman, Zeithaml
and Berry 1990). There are certain aspects of convenience which will be more or less important to
different segments, and the success of an organization depends on how well it identifies and
satisfies the appropriate measures of convenience.
3.5.2 Precision
While customers may make many choices based on convenience, they also expect quality in the
delivery of financial services and products. Customers are increasingly willing and able to choose
from a large number of investment and loan vehicles as banks compete with non-banks for
depositors and investors. Quality may suggest a whole host of things to the customer. Examples
include error free statements, checks printed correctly, and the operational soundness of all
delivery channels. Banks committed to quality and accuracy will anticipate problems and facilitate
a pain free resolution process. In fact banks may require higher levels of precision than their non-
bank competitors: one source of advantage over other kinds of organizations lies in the trust
consumers place in banks to handle their assets effectively. Mistakes in this process may drive
consumers to search for other financial providers.
The competitive environment faced by banks generates two sources of pressure for an error-free
operation. First, consumers may be willing to pay a price premium for what they perceive to be
responsiveness to their needs: accurate answers to their questions, useful advice about new
products, error-free statements, etc. On the other hand, competitors quickly match prices in this
market. Thus, even if the bank cannot extract a price premium, precision in operations may be a
key contributor to retaining or gaining market share. In one study by the Bank Administration
Institute (1993), industry leaders in consumer banking generally believed that other quality-related
factors would be more important contributors to the bank’s performance than the ability to exercise
price leadership.
In addition to the quality provided to the customer, precision in the delivery of financial services
and products enhances the performance of the bank by reducing “rework” in the system and hence,
costs. Time spent correcting errors may be better spent generating revenue, thereby encouraging
all institutions to be concerned about quality.
The ability to make good business decisions also relies on the level of precision in the bank. First,
the source information which forms the basis for any decision must be accurate. Second, the
institution must have the tools which enable the interpretation of the source information. For
example, making good lending decisions requires accurate information from the consumer, a18
detailed understanding of the economic environment, and tools such as credit scoring models to
facilitate the analysis process. While these decisions may occur without the benefit of
sophisticated tools, the ability of the bank to increase precision slightly on an individual credit
analysis might translate into systemic improvements.
3.5.3 Efficient Cost Structure
While precision and convenience may differentiate banks, the commodity nature of financial
products suggests that any firm unable to manage its cost structure effectively is at a serious
disadvantage. Our interviews and pilot survey show that driving down costs by doing more with
less is one practice of high-performing banks and thus, banks which fail to seize opportunities to
remove costs may be at a disadvantage. Thus, the goal is to maintain the appropriate cost structure
relative to the business and revenue mix.
It is precisely in this area where traditional measures of total factor productivity (Berger and
Humphrey 1992) might be considered. Many retail banks use intricate staffing models to control
branch labor costs, and “back office” processing of transactions focuses around taking costs -
particularly labor costs - out of these operations. In fact, technology spending in the industry often
aims at breaking the link between an increase in business and an increase in costs.
If a reduction of costs could occur in a vacuum, then every organization would try to push the
traditional productivity levers. However, a comprehensive analysis should consider the trade-offs
between the various value indicators. Efforts to reduce costs might also reduce quality and long-
term profitability. For example, if staffing models in bank branches accommodate only the time
needed for simple teller transactions, the resulting tight staffing control may inhibit the teller’s
ability to engage the customer in cross-selling of other financial products. Similarly, if tellers rush
as a result of tight staffing, the bank may experience a disastrous decrease in precision. Thus, we
must be careful when analyzing costs not to lose sight of the interconnectedness of value indicators
and profit implications of choices between these values (Berger, Hancock and Humphrey 1993).
3.5.4 Adaptability
The first indication of an organization’s adaptability is its willingness to meet the changing
demands of the customer. This willingness may be evidenced by pricing flexibility. It also
surfaces in the mass customization  movement making its way through the service industry (Pine
1993). Many customers have individual needs which are not easily satisfied by standard products
and services. Not surprisingly then, the need to customize products and services underlies much
of the recent IT investment of banks.
In addition to responding to the customer, financial institutions display adaptability in their ability
to respond to the marketplace. In competition with non-bank financial institutions, the bank’s
challenge is to create competitive products and introduce them to market before losing the chance to
compete in the larger industry. The introduction of mutual funds is a perfect illustration. Given
the opportunity to partake in the investment market, many banks have been slow to bring their
funds effectively to the market.
As change occurs, whether in the development of new products and services or the introduction of
new technology, the institution must respond with changes in the business processes.
Organizations and processes should be able to withstand and plan for change, as a lack of19
flexibility renders a firm unable to respond to changing business conditions.
3.5.5 Market Penetration
Provision of financial services involves ongoing relationships. It also entails frequent interaction
between customers and institutions. These interactions present opportunities to sell; that is, to
provide customers with further services that meet their needs. High-performing banks take
advantage of these opportunities. In part, they use their investments in human resources and
technology to increase their share of target markets.
In fact, enhanced market penetration is the expressed goal of much current investment in
technology, as well as the motivation behind the reform of management practices. The ability to
persuade consumers to buy multiple products from a single institution (“cross-selling”) and to
persuade them to do more of their business with that institution (“gaining share of wallet”)
contributes substantially to performance.
3.6 Financial/ Strategic Performance
One goal of this project is to ascertain the impact of industry conditions, strategy, and the
implementation issues inside the gray box in Figure 1 on overall financial performance. We start
with the contents of the gray box (the implementation of strategy given industry conditions) for
several reasons.
First, the financial performance (ROI, ROA, etc.) of the bank is an outcome of the decisions
described in the last section. Management places great emphasis on financial measures. However,
the links between these numbers and factors under management control are weak. Broader
industry conditions, such as interest rates, have large effects. Asset management decisions having
little or nothing to do with efficient operations may also move financial indicators. And accounting
decisions have substantial implications. For example, cost allocation between a retail bank and
other parts of the bank holding company will affect the measured financial performance of the retail
bank independently of its ability to deliver consumer products. Our interviews suggest that banks
which are able to do well on our chosen measures of value creation should, however, outperform
others in the long run, even on financial measures. Managers consistently express this sentiment;
our goal is to establish the extent to which their intuition is correct. To do so, however, we must
begin with the “gray box” in Figure 1; that is, those activities over which management has direct
control.
Our initial study will be a cross-sectional study of bank performance. In order to correlate
financial performance with the actions listed in the previous section - correcting properly for
strategy differences and industry conditions - it will be necessary to have a panel data set--
longitudinal data is essential. Our goal is to create such a panel data set. To begin, however, we
have chosen to focus on the cross-sectional data we can measure; namely, our value creation
variables. Financial performance matters and it is part of our research plan for the future; with the
current state of our knowledge and data, it simply cannot be pursued in a scholarly manner at this
point.20
3.7  Inside the “Gray” Box
3
Whether a clear set of best practices in retail banking actually exists, ultimately, is a question which
requires data rather than theory. The framework we have presented here allows for the possibility
that general best practices are identifiable, but also accommodates contingencies. The effectiveness
of practices may depend upon their relationships with other practices, organizational goals, and
industry conditions. That is to say, rather than identifying best practices, we are open to the
possibility that choices in infrastructure and implementation may be better or worse depending
upon their alignment with one another and with factors external to the gray box in Figure 1.
As described conceptually the framework may appear relatively static, but it does provide a vehicle
through which one can gain insight into more dynamic issues. For example, over the past few
years banks have spent a great deal of time, effort, and money on mergers and acquisitions. Under
our framework one might consider why expected gains are not often realized from mergers
(Berger, Hunter, and Timme 1993). When merging institutions more quickly align practices with
the strategies and goals of the new organization, one might expect better performance. Where, on
the other hand, infrastructures or implementation choices in the merging organizations are
inconsistent, or where the expense of changing management practices exceeds expectations,
performance may suffer.
We believe the framework lends itself to empirical analysis of performance questions. We also
suspect that we can establish evidence which supports the theory that there are management
practices which reinforce one another in order to create value and drive multiple performance
outcomes. Similarly, Roth and van der Velde (1991a: p.35) claimed a “counter-intuitive
discovery”:
Best-in-class retail banks developed both their operations and marketing capabilities
simultaneously, rather than sequentially. As a result, they enjoyed greater
profitability and superior performance across the board, but especially on
innovation and speed.
That is, the effective blending of management infrastructure and implementation choices, of human
resources, technology, and process management may make it possible to achieve better outcomes
in a number of areas at once.
3Since we believe that we can understand something about how the forces and practices inside the box in Figure 1
interrelate, the box isn’t “black”; i.e., impenetrable. Thus, it is “gray”; not easy to see into, but not impossible
either.21
4.0 Measuring Performance - A Research Strategy
To reach our goal of understanding the items within the “gray box” of Figure 1, we have planned
the following steps:
I. Dialogue with Industry Leaders
Our team visited twelve financial institutions in the summer of 1993 to learn about what the
industry considered to be the drivers of performance. We presented our initial framework,
which was a direct result of these interviews, to the Wharton Financial Institutions Center
Board of Directors in October 1993. After considering the comments from the Board, we
developed our pilot survey which spanned topics of human resources, marketing and retail
administration, technology, and service and product delivery processes. The original
survey is over 200 pages and required thirteen person-days on site to cover approximately
twenty-five interviews.
We administered the pilot survey to seven retail banks in the Spring of 1994. After visiting
half of the institutions we again met with the Board of Directors (May 1994) to get their
opinions and recommendations. We then completed the pilot visits, analyzed the data, and
revised the pilot accordingly. We have mailed this revised pilot to the original participants.
The revised pilot survey consists of approximately 100 pages of questions with a slightly
narrower scope. After analyzing the revised pilot data we will re-visit each institution to
present our results and get their feedback. After incorporating their feedback into the pilot,
we will have a version of the survey which will serve as the basis for a large-sample survey
to be administered in the Fall (see III).
II. Pilot Survey of Representative Retail Banks
As stated in Section 1.0, our interviews led us to focus on consumer financial services and,
more precisely, consumer banking in the first one and one-half years of the project. We are
influenced in this decision by the industry’s traditional view of its competitors. That is,
while non-bank financial services produce anxiety about the future, today the main concern
rests with other banks. In addition, we need to have a sharp focus to get more
comprehensive results about the industry. A pilot survey of seven retail banks was
conducted in Spring 1994; see the next section for the details of this survey.
III. Large-Sample Survey
Based on the pilot survey, we will conduct a large-sample survey through the Fall 1994.22
IV. Data Analysis
Spring 1995 will be devoted to testing specific hypotheses concerning the interrelationship
between management practices and our outcome measures. Along with traditional
regression-based analyses, we intend to utilize state-of-the-art techniques in multivariant
frontier estimation (e.g., Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and its recent stochastic
extensions; see Banker et al 1989; Land et al 1994; Seiford and Thrall 1990) to address the
mix or practice portfolio questions. That is, what mix of practices, holding constant the
industry conditions and strategy, are most efficient? See the next section for an initial list
of hypotheses.
In addition to consumer banking, we will begin a similar set of steps in consumer-based insurance
(i.e., property and casualty insurance and life insurance) in order to broaden our focus with the
consumer financial services arena.5.0 Measuring Performance - Results of the Pilot Study
The pilot study involved a three-phased approach that began in the summer of 1993 with industry
leader interviews. Discussions with these financial service industry executives revealed industry
practices, major initiatives and changes throughout the industry, and the major issues facing these
institutions. Our team has had discussions with executives at eighteen different financial
institutions and has administered the pilot survey at seven retail banks.
From the information gleaned in these interviews, and the work of past productivity studies, the
project team developed the pilot survey. The survey, which consisted of over 200 pages of
questions, focused on the practices of the various functional areas, business lines, product groups,
and the retail network. The administration of the survey required nine person days on-site and
included over 20 interviews. To supplement these interviews, the pilot involved observing and
mapping seventeen customer service processes in the branches and phone centers of each
institution. In total, the pilot surveyed the practices of seven large, geographically spread retail
banks with holding company assets of $230 billion, over 3,000 branches, and a workforce of
116,000 full–time equivalents (FTEs).
The third and current phase of the pilot includes analysis of the survey data, revision of the survey,
requests for further information based on these revisions, and a presentation of our analysis to the
original participants. The revised survey forms the basis for the instrument which will be used in
the large-sample survey scheduled to be administered during the fall of 1994.
5.1  Choice of Management Infrastructure
5.1.1 Resource Management
Method:
The pilot survey investigated the variation in resource management processes and outcomes at each
institution by asking questions about resource allocation and by collecting the budgets of each
institution. In addition, this analysis relied on publicly available information to establish reporting
consistency. The pilot attempted to understand how each institution consumes its resources and
how they decide in what area to invest. While the pilot did not focus on the budgeting and capital
allocation  processes, we did survey the analysis required to justify investments and the forum for
making the actual decision.
Pilot Observations:
The justification and decision-making process differs widely among the pilot institutions. Bank D,
for example, requires an extensive cost-benefit analysis for every major investment be it a new
branch opening or a major technology investment. After this analysis, a management committee
reviews each initiative. In contrast, most of the other pilot organizations had separate committees
for major technology investments and for large capital expenses. In effect, these separate
committees formally built different decision processes into the management structure of their
institutions.
The extent to which resource allocation affects value creation is unclear. Spending in different
resource areas affects different value outcomes, and choosing which values to stress involves the24
same justifications and trade-offs that resource allocation involves. As a result of the variations and
the reliance of this spending on institutional strategy, resource allocation will be a control variable
in the large-sample survey.
5.1.2 Information Architecture
Method:
The pilot survey examined each firm’s approach to information architecture by looking for a
documented architecture and by questioning the bank’s commitment to that architecture. This
commitment is visible in a firm’s assignment of accountability, level of information
standardization, and the extent of automation of the collection and dissemination of data.
Pilot Observations:
With regard to automation, every bank reported that it would be useful to disseminate performance
information on-line. Given this, it is interesting that none of the seven pilot institutions currently
have such on-line information available. Moreover, only Bank A and Bank F report on-line
performance information as a current initiative.
The level of automation in collecting performance information also speaks to a bank’s commitment
to an information architecture. For example, the systems at Bank A and Bank D automatically
collect a platform representative’s sales information at the point of sale. In contrast, Bank E and
Bank F still maintain manual logs given to the branch manager on a daily basis. While both of
these methods have the potential to communicate the same information, institutions with a strong
information architecture (and thus an automated method for seamless tracking) seem to see
performance measurement as an integral step in the delivery process.
Finally, although we have not yet collected all the necessary data, we believe that institutions which
enforce a common architecture, especially at the time of mergers, will have improved performance
even though they might experience a decrease in local control. A non-pilot bank with which we
have had discussions did not enforce a common architecture concerning loan applications and thus
had to manage over three dozen different software applications performing the same task. When
the institution sought performance data on all the applications combined, it had to make an
enormous investment to overlay a performance measurement system on to each of the individual
applications. Even with this technological overlay, the integrity of the institution’s data was
suspect due to the vast number of inputs and outputs to the many systems. We believe that
enforcing a common architecture (and systems) upfront is necessary for improved performance.
Propositions:
Institutions which define and enforce a common information architecture experience improved
performance.
Institutions with more automated performance information experience improved performance.25
5.1.3 Performance Management and Control
Method:
In assessing the ability of organizations to define measures that evaluate their own performance,
collect the necessary data, and use this information to direct the organization, the pilot survey
focused on the types of reports and measures used by the banks. In addition, our preliminary
analysis examined both the appropriateness of this information against the goals of the organization
and the ability of the bank to use this information to drive the bank toward these goals.
The pilot seeks information on whether each organization has the correct level of information and
on the extent to which management uses the available information to control the organization. This
includes level of empowerment, the alignment of accountability, and the use of information to
measure and incent positive behavior in all levels of the organization.
Pilot Observations:
One finding of the pilot is that the information used by each bank to manage performance is fairly
similar. Each bank seems to use a combination of financial measures, sales volumes, quality
indicators, and productivity measures to evaluate performance and make decisions. In addition,
each bank uses historical information such as budget variances and competitive comparisons such
as peer groups to evaluate relative success. The variation in the actual information used seems tied
to the level of detail used to determining success. For example, for each level of the branch staff,
Bank A measures key performance indicators. For tellers, a component of performance is the
number of transactions per FTE while the platform staff has sales volumes as a partial indicator of
their success. Similarly, Bank B measures sales related behavior for every level of the bank.
While platform representatives are measured by unit sales, tellers are evaluated by the number of
referrals that they generate through their constant customer flow. While the other institutions focus
on the same larger measures, they do not seem to measure behavioral performance with the same
level of detail as Bank A or Bank B.
According to discussions with bank management, each institution seems to have a different
philosophy regarding standardized performance measurement. At some banks, for example, every
affiliate is responsible for the same financial hurdle rate. If a branch or legal entity does not meet
this goal, then management steps in to facilitate improvement. These banks believe that local
control is essential for success but measures this success relative to a common standard. In
contrast, other banks see each branch as individual and incomparable to any other branch in their
organization. Rather than forcing each branch to strive toward a common goal, these banks set
performance goals individually for each branch based on a combination of prior performance and
market potential.
Propositions:
Institutions which measure the controllable aspects at each level of the organization and allow
management this control will perform better.
Institutions which manage toward specific controllable values such as convenience, precision, or
cost effectiveness will perform better.26
5.1.4 Organizational Structure
Method:
In attempting to evaluate the appropriateness and effectiveness of an organizational structure, the
pilot survey examined the placement of key functional areas within the retail bank, the effect of
technology on organizational structure, and the choices that institutions make regarding
centralization, local control, economies of scale, communication, and organizational focus.
Pilot Observations:
One observation in the first phase of the pilot relates to the ability of the retail bank to control the
components of success. However, according to the organizational charts provided by each
institution, this control does not always exist. Bank B, Bank E, and Bank F each indicate that
bank operations report directly to their chief executive rather than to the head of the retail bank.
The trade-off here is that the centralization allows for potential economies of scale and increased
control but the disadvantage is that the operations have no accountability to the retail bank built in
to the organizational structure; that is, a potential problem is that the operations employees have no
direct link to the retail customers. A related issue is the location of the phone center. Typically the
phone center resides in the operations area but is almost exclusively responsible for customer
service issues. If the operations area does not report to the retail bank then there is a potential
disconnect between strategy and implementation.
Certain organizational structures seem to encourage economies of scale and the elimination of
redundancies. For example, two of the pilot institutions combine many legal entities under one
holding company. However, the first allows each entity to maintain local control complete with its
own phone center, operations department, and human resource function while the second’s
consolidated human resource, operations, and marketing departments serve all of its institutions.
In essence, the first seems to have a retail bank for each of its many legal entities while the second
has one retail structure for its many legal entities. While the first’s structure complements its local
control philosophy, it contradicts the common goal to remove functional repetition.
The pilot interviews documented communication barriers in several organizations. At one
organization, senior executives introduced themselves to each other despite the fact that they all
reside in the centralized corporate headquarters. At another organization, management is dispersed
geographically, making decision making and communication dependent on the telephone or
advance planning.
The legacy of organizational structure is apparent in many of the organizations we surveyed.
While certain banks claim strategies that are customer segment, delivery channel, or product
oriented, almost every institution organizes itself functionally and geographically. In fact, none of
the organizations surveyed are primarily organized around customer segments or delivery
channels.
Propositions:
Institutions which organize around the individual strategy of the organization will perform better.
Institutions which consolidate functional areas such as marketing, human resources, and
technology at the holding company level create economies of scale, eliminate functional
redundancies, and leverage off shared resources and institutional knowledge. Thus they will
perform better.27
Institutions in which the retail bank controls the contributors to its success will perform better.
5.2 Implementation Choices
5.2.1 Human Resource Choices
Method:
The pilot survey examined six categories of human resource management practices: compensation,
hiring and selection, staffing, training, work organization, and employee involvement. The survey
documented a variety of practices in each area, measuring both the presence or absence of
particular practices as well as the intensity with which the various banks engaged in them.
Pilot Observations:
We began the study searching for practices which we believed would drive the creation of value in
the categories identified above, both in building a work force with the right skill set and in
incenting employees to perform. Perhaps the most striking finding from the pilot survey on the
behavioral side is the absence of practices characteristic of what have been termed “High-
Performance Work Organizations” (HPWOs) (Osterman 1994; Huselid 1994). For example, none
of the pilot banks have a majority of their employees engaged in employee involvement programs,
quality circles, or similar schemes. The extent to which non-managerial employees influence
decisions in a number of key areas from technology deployment and job design to hiring and other
personnel decisions is low or very low in all the respondent organizations.
Practices which characteristically support HPWOs are also scarce. None of the banks has a “pay-
for-skills” system for any employees. While all the banks give merit-based increases, the use of
compensation packages which consist of truly variable pay is low: only Bank B and Bank C report
that teller pay has a variable component. Platform employees’ pay has a variable component in
four of the banks; typically this is a modest sales incentive (sales incentives are also present for
officers in five of the banks). At four of the seven respondents, branch managers’ pay varies with
the performance of their branches and two of those banks also have small branch-based pay
incentives for other employees. Only one, Bank G, has a compensation incentive based on the
overall performance of the organization.
Nor are the banks particularly innovative in building a workforce with the proper skill set. With
respect to selection, for example, all the banks engage in interviewing and reviewing of previous
work records, and several use skills tests to screen teller applicants. But only Bank B uses further
selection procedures (personality tests) for tellers or platform employees. Bank B, Bank D, and
Bank E each use psychological tests and/or group exercises for managers and officers.
Most of the employees within particular job categories in the banks are broadly skilled. That is, in
spite of some moves toward “peak-time” staffing, particularly of tellers, nearly all employees
within a particular job category do nearly all the tasks associated with that job. This may create
flexibility and remove the necessity for the more formal job rotation programs which are part of
many HPWOs. However, the general extent to which employees are flexible across categories is
not high. For example, on only two of the seven banks are more than 60% of the platform
employees trained to do teller tasks, and in only two banks are more than 20% of the tellers trained
to work on the platform.28
If, then, most practices characteristic of HPWOs have not been commonly adopted in retail
banking, there are two competing hypotheses which might explain this general finding. First, it is
possible that retail banking is an inappropriate setting for employee involvement and other practices
characteristic of HPWOs, and that the performance results associated with HPWOs in other studies
would not be realized in retail banks. More elaborate schemes for employee empowerment, group
incentives, or cross-training may not be necessary in retail banking: perhaps they are neutral or
even negatively associated with performance outcomes. It is, however, possible that the practices
have been slow to diffuse even though they (or a subset of them) have positive effects on
performance. If this is the case, then we might expect that banks further along toward adoption of
practices characteristic of HPWOs will have better performance outcomes, other things being
equal. The ultimate answer to this debate is empirical.
In order to probe this question, we take a closer look at variation across some practices.
Generally, one might investigate whether banks with higher levels of employee involvement and
cross-training out-perform other banks. Both Bank A and Bank B, for example, report higher
levels of employee involvement than the other banks. Bank B consistently reports more latitude
and discretion for employees, especially platform employees, to adjust product features and serve
customers. Bank B also reports the highest levels of cross-training between tellers and platform
employees; Bank E, Bank F, and Bank G each report some cross-training; Bank A, Bank C, and
Bank D report the least.
Different human resource issues also suggest themselves for different employee groups. For
example, issues of compensation, training, and job design for tellers are confounded by the
demands of productivity-based staffing models. These models typically encourage bank branches
to employ more “peak-time” and part-time tellers. But these part-time employees, who generally
do not receive benefits, may feel less committed to the organization. The share of tellers working
less than full-time varies from 40% to 84%. An open question is whether the direct labor cost
savings realized from the use of part-timers is outweighed by other costs such as lost sales, errors,
inferior service, or increased training requirements.
On the platform, where staffing models have not yet become commonplace and most employees
work a regular shift, questions around performance and customer service may center around job
design and the effective use of down-time. Here one might ask whether using platform employees
to engage in off-line tasks such as tele-marketing (Bank B) or substituting for tellers (Bank F)
enhances performance outcomes.
Further issues for platform employees and managers center around incentive pay and selection.
For branch managers, for example, the extent to which pay is “at risk” varied from over 20% at
Bank D to less than 10% at Bank C, Bank F, and Bank G. Practices regarding internal promotion
to these key jobs also vary: Bank B hires only 10% of its platform employees from outside the
bank, for example, while Bank E hires 95% from the outside. Again, the question remains open
as to which practices are more likely to be associated with better performance.
Propositions:
Generally, higher levels of employee empowerment, small-group and large-group incentive pay,
and cross-trained employees will lead to better organizational performance.
Practices have stronger effects where bundles of practices taken together represent a coherent
human resource strategy.
Staffing decisions, promotion patterns, job design, and different kinds of individual incentive29
programs may also have effects on organizational performance; the direction of the effects is an
open question.
5.2.2 Technology Implementation Processes
Method:
The pilot survey examined the effect of technology on the structural organization as well as the way
each organization views the role of technology in competitiveness. In addition, the pilot surveyed
the goals of each institution in technology implementation and their selection process.
Pilot Observations:
Technology implementation in retail banks can be characterized by whether a bank uses technology
to achieve a leadership position or maintain different levels of competitiveness with the rest of the
industry. Bank A and Bank B each see technology as a competitive advantage and deploy large
amounts of resources to maintain this edge. Other institutions, such as Bank C and Bank G, see
technology as a way to increase convenience to the customer, increase precision, and reduce costs.
Bank E and Bank F assume that, based on the environment and competitive positioning, R&D
dollars will never produce the necessary level of benefit. These banks focus technology projects
on increasing efficiency and wait until other institutions have refined the technology or develop
only when they have control of a niche product or service.
As a result of these different philosophies, the pilot institutions are spending their technology
dollars in different ways as described in Table 1:
Table 1. Technology Spending for Value Creation
*Bank A describes its “other” spending as directly related to competitive advantage.
Bank A and Bank B have spent their money on highly sophisticated platform technology which
supports aggressive marketing efforts and increases customer interaction in the routine processes.
For example, Bank B’s platform system displays an image of a potential check on screen so that
the customer can verify the accuracy of the information before ordering the checks. Similarly,
Bank A’s platform system prompts the platform representative to recognize sales opportunities and
explain product details to the customer. Bank C and Bank G seem to be using technology to
standardize and automate their branch systems, while Bank E and Bank F focus their spending on
basic levels of automation and customer service.30
Table 1 also shows that in allocating technology dollars, banks do consider the impact of
technology on value creation. To justify technology spending, all the pilot banks engage in a pre-
project analysis which measures the cost of the project against the anticipated benefits. However,
while these institutions articulate the objectives of the technology projects in terms of value, none
of the banks successfully measure the value creation through post-project analysis.
While some organizations go beyond using technology to decrease costs and improve productivity,
this is a primary goal for all organizations making a significant investment in technology.
Spending in this area seems to decrease the time required to satisfy customer demands, increase
precision by improving decision making abilities, increase the availability of information, and
increase convenience to the customer. While the specific effects of technology on value creation
are detailed later, Table 2 outlines the types of technology currently in use at the pilot institutions (a
credit scoring model is an automated way to assess a loan application; loan application processing
software facilitates the automated printing of the correct documents; an on-line research system is
the electronic communication of research requests; marketing/ cross-sell prompts is a decision
support tool that suggests which products a particular customer might be interested in; a VRU is an
automated voice response unit that handles calls to the phone center electronically; on-line sales
tracking automatically captures sales statistics at the point of sale; windows based platform
software is software with a higher user interface; and loan by phone is the ability to apply for a loan
without entering the branch):
Table 2. Technology in Use at Pilot Institutions
Propositions:
The following practices with regard to technology implementation increase the likelihood of project
success and enhance overall bank performance:
Relating technology projects directly to value creation.
Extensive pre and post project cost-benefit analyses and accountability.
Centralized decision making.31
More automation of alternative delivery (e.g., banking from home via PC) leads to improved
performance.
More automation of existing delivery (e.g., platform automation, voice response unit (VRU)) leads
to improved performance.
The automation of entire processes (rather than single steps) leads to improved performance.
5.2.3 Product
Method:
and Service Delivery Processes
In looking at delivery processes, the pilot team examined the different methods to satisfy 17
customer requests at each institution. The team produced a process map for each process which
included characteristics such as process steps, cycle time, activity time, the number of departments
involved, and the level of automation (see separate document on process variation for a complete
set of the process maps).
Pilot Observations:
One of the most surprising observations of the pilot study is the variation in the steps required to
complete the same transaction at different banks. As a result of different technology, work-steps,
and organizational structures, satisfying the same customer request at different institutions requires
the involvement of different departments, and different amounts of time. For example, Table 3
illustrates that opening a checking account may take anywhere from five days at Bank D to
seventeen days at Bank E (cycle time is the total time to complete the process; activity time is the
amount of time in the process where work is being performed; hand-offs is the number of times
that work is passed from one employee to another; people is the number of people involved;
departments is the number of departments involved; and screens is the number of screens required
on the software applications):
Table 3. Comparison of Process Characteristics: Open a Checking Account32
Similarly, Table 4 illustrates that Bank A replaces a lost ATM card in two and a half days, while
Bank F requires fourteen days:
Table 4. Comparison of Process Characteristics: Replace a Lost ATM Card
With regard to technology, each bank uses different software applications and a different number
of forms to complete each process. For example, opening a checking account at Bank C requires
the platform representative to complete seven screens while the same transaction at Bank D requires
36 screens. It is interesting that despite the seemingly cumbersome Bank D application software,
the screen-intensive process actually consumes less time than the process with less software
demands, a disconnect which seems to correspond to the type of application software in use. In
some instances, institutions which use Microsoft Windows-based applications require many more
screens to complete a transaction. However, these banks collect more information about their
customers and enhance their ability to increase sales by building cross-sell suggestions into the
application process.
Another observation of the screen-intensive process is that these organizations tend to automate the
collection of sales information. Bank A, Bank B, and Bank D track each platform representatives’
sales when they enter the new account on the system. Moreover, the processes encourage greater
interaction with the customer as they suggest additional products and contain screens which explain
product features to the customer.
Along with the differences in work-steps, each institution allows a different level of functionality
through alternative delivery. For example, Bank B allows customers to open checking accounts
over the computer and to apply for home equity loans through the phone center, an option that
allows customers to receive funds in as little as 24 hours. Other institutions require the customer to
visit the branch to complete the same transactions. Greater access through alternative delivery may
have contradictory effects on the process. For instance, while the ability to apply for accounts or
loans over the phone may decrease the time required from the customer, it may also require the
bank to introduce special steps to safeguard against fraud.33
Another interesting process variation is the level of redundancy. The small business loan
application process highlights this characteristic in that banks such as Bank E and Bank G perform
loan analysis both in the branch and in a centralized credit analysis area. Representatives in these
banks spend many hours reviewing the customer’s financial information and writing an evaluation
of the credit, only to send the loan package to an underwriter who repeats the same analysis and
makes the ultimate decision. These institutions emphasize the personal relationship between the
banker and the customer at the expense of potential efficiencies. In contrast, other institutions send
the loan application and the financials directly to the underwriting department preferring to draw
upon the expertise of the credit officers and shorten the process.
The presence of such inefficiencies highlights a surprising realization. Although selling products
and providing service to customers is the main objective of a bank, many of the pilot institutions
were unclear about the requirements to actually complete these tasks. None of the institutions
seemed to have detailed knowledge about the steps or resources required to complete basic tasks.
Process flows are non-existent at most institutions and the pilot survey did not reveal any
institution which had undergone an activity based costing exercise or a functional cost study. In
fact, except at the most automated institutions, workflow seems to be something that develops over
time without any analysis of the cost involved in various options.
Bank F, for example, described a phone center process in which the phone representative wrote
information on one piece of paper, only to recopy it onto another form for processing. In addition,
Bank F phone representatives described several processes in which they recorded a problem and
then forwarded it to the branch for processing. Not surprisingly, the branch personnel report that
if a customer comes to the branch with a balance inquiry or to report a lost ATM card, the platform
representative directs the customer to a phone bank with direct access to the telephone center.
These types of inefficiencies are not individual to Bank F, although the less automated and more
paper intensive a bank is, the more inefficient it seems.
Propositions:
Technology enabled processes increase efficiency, precision, and convenience, as well as
increasing the amount of information available to the bank on both the customer base and the sales
staff.
Processes design which takes advantage of the customer interaction will increase penetration and
convenience.
Institutions which have made a commitment to logical process design will have enhanced
performance.34
5.3  Value Creation
Our discussion of value creation is in large part the result of the pilot study. As the observable and
measurable indicators of performance in retail banking, this section highlights the information
collected through the interview and survey process.
5.3.1 Customer Convenience
Method:
In evaluating convenience to the customer, the pilot surveyed several ways that banks create
convenience. First, we looked at total availability to the customer as a measure of the amount of
time that banking services, through all delivery channels, are available to customers. This includes
branch hours, ATM hours, access through a voice response system, and the availability of all other
channels such as computer banking or non-traditional branch options. In addition, the pilot
assessed the level of functionality available through alternative delivery. For example, the pilot
assessed the ability to perform various transactions without ever coming to a branch. Finally, the
pilot assessed the time to meet a customer’s demand and the time required of customers in the
process.
Pilot Observations:
One measure of convenience to the customer is the amount of availability that the banks provide
through their various distribution channels. Some banks provide continual access through 24 hour
ATM machines, phone centers, and VRU (voice response unit) service, while other banks do not
need to provide this level of access as a result of their particular market. Table 5 illustrates the
variation in weekly availability:
Table 5. Average Weekly Availability for Delivery Channels
According to the survey responses, every institution except Bank E provides 24 hour access
through ATMs and voice response systems. However, Banks A, D, and G provide phone center
representatives 24 hours per day and only Bank A provides 24 hour access via personal computer.
In attempting to create convenience for customers, all the pilot banks are attempting to increase the
service provided without a branch visit. Table 6 illustrates the variation in the institutions ability to
accommodate transactions without going to the branch:35
Table 6. Transactions Handled Without Branch Visit
For sophisticated banks such as Bank B, this means handling a large range of transactions through
the phone or the personal computer, including opening accounts or applying for loans. In the case
of less advanced banks, services outside the branch may include only basic transactions such as
balance inquiries.
Another measure of convenience to the customer is the speed of satisfying a need. Measuring from
the initial contact to the point in the process where satisfaction occurs indicates a bank’s
responsiveness to the needs of the customer. Table 7 illustrates the variation with respect to time
required to satisfy particular customer requests:
Table 7. Time Required to Satisfy Customer Request
While the time to satisfy a customer’s request indicates the bank’s commitment to convenience,
another interesting measure is the amount of time during which a customer participates in the
process (see Table 8). For example, to apply for a checking account, a customer must often come
to the branch and fill out an application or sit while a platform representative fills out the application
on-line. The complexity of the account application, the speed of the system software, and the
extent to which a bank tries to turn any customer interaction into increased sales will determine the
resources required of the customer. The time required of the customer in receiving service from the
bank illustrates the co-productive nature of the financial service process. Table 8 illustrates the
variation with respect to customer participation time:36
Table 8. Customer Time Required in Process
5.3.2 Precision
Method:
Every institution has concerns surrounding quality and precision; however, it is difficult to quantify
front-end or branch precision. Instead, the pilot observed several factors which speak to an
institution’s level of concern for and effectiveness in planning for error correction. To this end,
one focus of our process analysis was how complicated the error resolution is. In addition, we
surveyed the empowerment or discretion of bank employees to resolve problems.
Besides precision from the customer’s perspective, the pilot considered the bank’s efforts to
increase precision for its own benefit. For example, banks might improve the predictive accuracy
of credit analysis by using credit scoring models or decrease transcription errors by opening new
accounts directly on-line.
Pilot Observations:
The pilot banks shared one characteristic concerning precision: they rarely used information on
error rates, required re-work, or other traditional indicators of quality. Most institutions reported
fairly similar, low error rates associated with the products and processes documented in the pilot
study. However, we are not yet convinced that the variation across banks is small or trivial. We
are exploring alternative methods of gathering comparable data on precision (for example, customer
surveys).
However, through the examination of aspects of process design we have begun to understand how
to differentiate performance in this category. The practices of the respondent institutions speak to
the level of concern each institution has for problem resolution. For example, each bank responded
that both branch managers and platform representatives are empowered to correct errors.
Institutions such as Bank B, however, have developed sophisticated tools to prevent errors and to
deal with errors when they occur. One example of Bank B’s dedication to precision is the on-
screen check image by which the customer verifies the accuracy of the information requested on the
check. Another example is an automated problem tracking system that logs problems submitted to
the research area and maintains a running list of problems still unresolved. Only a few of the
surveyed institutions have an automated means of communicating with the research department,
and only Bank B has this tracking system. Other institutions request research by filling out a form
and faxing or interoffice mailing it to the research department.37
Besides anticipating the need for customer precision, banks can work toward improving their own
level of precision through sophisticated decision support tools. With the exception of Bank F the
pilot institutions currently use credit scoring models to evaluate potential loans. Most banks use
staffing models to provide the appropriate level of staff for customer service needs, and many
institutions either use, or are in the process of moving to, centralized loan processing groups to




The pilot survey attempts to examine the need for banks to control costs without sacrificing other
values to a harmful extent. With regard to customer costs, the pilot asked each bank about its
pricing relative to the marketplace.
Pilot Observations:
With regard to cost effectiveness for the consumer, the pilot survey asked each bank to place
themselves in their market according to price. The majority seems to operate from a position of
strength in the market place, paying average or lower than market rates for deposits and charging
higher than average fees for checking accounts. Table 9 illustrates the variation with respect to
product pricing relative to the corresponding markets:
Table 9. Product Pricing Relative to the Market
This pricing analysis supports the connection between high service and high costs, as Bank B
charges extremely high fees for its technologically advanced service while Bank F charges average
loan rates and lower-than-average checking fees.
Another illustration of the need to achieve the right balance between cost and value creation, is the
experience of Bank D with sales incentives. Seeking to encourage revenue growth through selling38
multiple products,  Bank D began a variable pay system which overcompensated its sales staff
relative to the market. While sales increased, the cost of the motivation was so extreme that it was
not an efficient means of producing revenue. This year, Bank D has adjusted the levels of sales
points attributable to each sale.
We are continuing to explore more traditional measures of factor productivity by combining data
from the pilot survey with publicly available figures.  In the pilot phase, we found difficulty in
collecting many of the measures we had hoped to use. Further analysis of this data will be done
after the revised pilot survey is completed.
5.3.4 Adaptability
Method:
As mentioned in Section 3.5.4, our interest is in assessing an institution’s adaptability to its
customers as well as to their marketplace. In the pilot survey, an institution’s willingness to adjust
price, rates or fees was a measure of adaptability to the customer. Marketplace adaptability
surrounded an institution’s handling of the mutual fund product. We chose this product as it is one
of the few new products recently developed. (As of this printing, we have not yet completed the
mutual fund data collection.)
Pilot Observations:
As stated previously, most institutions do not empower their customer service representatives to
negotiate the price or rates of their products. Table 10 highlights the home equity loan product as
an example; note that the results differ little for the other products.
Table 10. Authority to Negotiate Home Equity Loan Rates and Fees39
5.3.5 Market Penetration
Method:
This category was added as a result of the initial pilot survey. We are obtaining measures which
are comparable across organizations in the revised pilot.
Conclusion
Managers in consumer financial services typically assume that improvement in one area of
performance is largely at the expense of decreased performance in other areas. That is to say,
convenience, precision, cost savings, revenue growth, and adaptability can each be enhanced, but
must be traded off against one another. This is only partly true. For example, in some
organizations we documented very high levels of technology spending aimed at increasing
precision or the ability to cross-sell products. We also found that some organizations had settled
for limits on convenience, believing that further decreases in turnaround time, for example, would
be too expensive or would result in unacceptable levels of errors.
However, one strong proposition has emerged from the pilot study but awaits testing with a
broader data set and better non-financial performance measures. We believe that better
management practices can move outcomes in a number of areas simultaneously. That is, through
effective process design, use of technology, and management of human resources institutions can
improve performance in multiple categories. We saw examples of this frequently: well-designed
processes, with proper technology, appropriately staffed and managed, led to breakthroughs in
performance. Errors decreased as did customer waiting time; satisfied customers were more likely
to retain accounts and be cross-sold new ones; there were cost savings; there was an increase in
adpatability and availability.
The general point is that while there may be trade-offs between performance outcomes, managing
these trade-offs may not be critical in high-performing organizations. Rather, we believe that
successful financial service organizations will be those which find processes and practices that
enhance multiple measures of performance. While this may seem “counter-intuitive” (Roth and van
der Velde 199la) to those with industry experience, there do exist precedents for the assertion. To
take one example from manufacturing, auto assembly plants which had moved most closely to the
“lean production” paradigm, had both lowest levels of assembly defects and highest levels of labor
productivity: other plants continued to trade off quality for productivity (MacDuffie 1991). Our
pilot work represents a starting point for understanding the relationships between practices and
outcomes, and setting these relationships in the context of broader organizational goals and
industry conditions.40
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